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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of the productivity slowdown based on the ef-
fects that uncertainty has on the productivity of specialized capital. Uncertainty
reduces the e±ciency of in°exible capital and generates a slowdown. It also in-
creases the demand for °exible capital which reteins its productivity in the new
volatile environment. The increase in the share of °exible capital explains the
acceleration of the rate of productivity growth embodied in new capital observed
by McHugh and Lane [1987]. This fact is di±cult to explain by the theories that
emphasize the cost of implementing the new technologies as thecause of the slow-
down. The model also highlights the positive e®ect that uncertainty has on the
speed of di®usion of technologies, and on the rate of technological progress. These
relationships are successfully tested in manufacturing and are used to explain the
rapid di®usion of computers and thespectacular TFP growth rate of thecomputer
producing sectors.
JEL: D2, D8, D9, O3.
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1Because every client is unique,
we must be °exible.
Balducci's.
1 Introduction
Since the 1970's most OECD economies have experienced a very sizeable decline in the
growthrate of total factor productivity (TFP). This decline is knownas the productivity
slowdown. In the U.S. the decline in the annual growth rate has been of about 1.8
percentage points.1 In manufacturing, the decline in TFP growth during the 70's was
followedby a recovery duringthe 80's, while in services the slow growthcontinued(¯gure
1).2
The most successful explanation of the evolution of TFP growth in manufacturing is
the General Purpose Technology (GPT) approach (Hornstein and Krusell [1996], Green-
wood andYorukoglu [1997], Helpman and Trajtenberg [1998], Greenwood and Jovanovic
[1998]). According to this theory, the advent of new general purpose technologies such
as information technologies ¯rst lowers productivity growth as ¯rms learn how to use
the new technologies, and later raises productivity growth as the productive bene¯ts of
these technologies become fully realized. Whereas the GPT approach to the slowdown
¯ts the general trend in manufacturing productivity, it does not ¯t with some of the
details. In particular, it appears to be at variance with the contribution of investment
in new capital to economic growth.
Solow [1959] introduced thedistinctionbetweenembodied and disembodiedproductivity
growth. His idea was that there are certain types of productivity gains that \can be
introduced into the production process only through gross investment in new plant and
equipment." Hecalledthis type of technological progress embodied productivity growth,
andcontrastedit withdisembodiedproductivity growth which makes oldandnewcapital
1These data correspond to the private business sector which represents 80% of the U.S. economy.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics http://146.142.4.24/cgi-bin/surveymost?mp. The pre-70's period
used in this calculation is 1947-73, and the post-70's is 1973-97. The slowdown is very robust to other
partitions.
2This ¯gure is constructed using data compiled by Jorgenson and available at his web page:
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html
2equally more productive. In this paper, I argue that the evolution of embodied and
disembodied productivity growth can shed new light on the causes of the slowdown.
There have been several attempts to estimate the relative contribution of embodied and
disembodied TFP growth to the productivity slowdown ( McHugh and Lane [1987],
Hornstein and Krusell [1996] and Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997]). All point to an
acceleration in embodied technological progress since 1973 and simultaneous decline in
disembodied productivity growth. As we shall see, it is hard to reconcile the GPT
approach with this fact.
I propose an alternative explanation of the productivity slowdown, one that is consis-
tent with the evidence on embodied and disembodied productivity growth. I argue that
in the 1970's there was a general increase in the uncertainty that ¯rms faced. As the
business environment became more unpredictable, ¯rms responded by adopting more
°exible production technologies. In this view the productivity slowdown was concen-
trated in the old technologies, which were ill suited to rapidly changing conditions. New
technologies retained their productivity because of their increased °exibility. The short
run acceleration of the rate of embodied TFP growth was the result of this shift in
investment from in°exible to °exible capital.
There are two parts to the story. The ¯rst part is that there was an increase in the
uncertainty in the 70's. This hypothesis appears reasonable at ¯rst glance. The 70's
witnessed a variety of events that contributed to ¯rm level uncertainty, including the
oil shocks, stop and go monetary policy, the demise of Bretton Woods, and increased
globalization. In section 4, I argue more formally that this increase in uncertainty is
evident in a variety of measures of economic activity. I show that the average volatility
of individual ¯rm stock returns increased between the 60's and the 70's, indicating the
presence of shocks that a®ected ¯rms' pro¯tability. I also show that there has been an
upward trend in the excess job reallocation rate. The excess job reallocation rate is the
di®erence between gross and net job creation or the amount of simultaneous job creation
and destruction. It is indicative of a shifting business climate. The upward trend also
points to an increase in the uncertainty that ¯rms face.
The second stepinthe argument is the connection betweenuncertainty and TFP growth.
InSection3, I model the decision of a¯rm to upgrade thequality of its capital stock. The
¯rm faces two decisions: when to replace its capital and what type of capital to choose.
3Capital in the model is specialized. It is fabricated to e±ciently produce a particular
good with particular characteristics. Capital, however, di®ers in its °exibility. The more
°exible capital is, the more easily it can be adapted to produce products with di®erent
characteristics. When the business environmentis uncertainthecharacteristicsof desired
output are constantly changing. Old in°exible machines become less productive while
the new °exible technologies are more desirable. By substituting old by new capital,
¯rms obtain an extra boost in their productivity. As a result the measures of embodied
technological progress increase and measures of disembodied technological progress fall.
There is a vast amount of informal evidence showing that, since the 1970's, the di®usion
of programmable automation technologies3 (PA) has increased the °exibility and e±-
ciency of production in manufacturing.4;5 In Section 4, I present econometric evidence
in support of the e®ect of uncertainty on TFP. One implication of the model is that
those sectors that experienced a larger increase in uncertainty should su®er a larger de-
cline in TFP growth. This negative e®ect of uncertainty appears in the data. A second
implication is that productivity slows less in those sectors that are able to implement
more intensively the °exible technologies. I test this implication by looking at the ef-
fect of computers on TFP growth. I ¯nd a positive e®ect, which speaks in favor of the
uncertainty-driven theory. Note that it is hard to reconcile this ¯nding with a model
where the slowdown is caused by the implementation of computers.
The model alsopredicts thatinmore uncertainenvironments, equipment will be replaced
more frequently. The reason is that when the economic environment changes more
rapidly, the installed equipment becomes quickly ill-suited to producing the optimal
commodity. An increase in the uncertainty therefore has important consequences for
the speed of di®usion of technologies. I ¯nd empirical support for this implication of
3The main exponents of the PA are computer-aided design (CAD), robots, numerically controlled
(NC) machine tools, °exible manufacturing systems (FMSs).
4Examples abound. Computerized process-control equipment allows steel producers to regulate the
carbon content of steel more precisely and to add a sequence of di®erent alloys without interrupting
the °ow of production (Greene [1982]). This together with the computer-controlled cutting-and-rolling
equipment facilitates the changeover from one product to another. Advances in the 1970's in semi-
conductor and computer technology made possible the development of numerically controlled (NC)
machines that could easily be reprogrammed to perform the wide range of simple tasks that make up
the majority of machining jobs. For more evidence on the °exibility gains associated with the PA
technologies see Piore and Sabel [1984], OTA [1984] and Milgrom and Roberts [1990].
5Although many of the improvements in °exibility have been possible thanks to the development of
the computers and the semiconductors, many other have been quite independent of these technologies
like, for example the just-in-time system or the mini-mills.
4the model in Section 4: using as a proxy for uncertainty the average volatility of stock
returns for the ¯rms in each 4-digit manufacturing sector, I ¯nd that an increase in
uncertainty leads to an increase in the speed of di®usion of computers.
Another implicationof the model is that an increase in the speedof di®usion oftechnolo-
gies a®ects the value of innovations. With shorter di®usion lags, successful innovators
capture the incumbent's market share sooner. This makes innovation activities more
attractive in a way that is consistent with the experience of the OECD economies since
the mid-1970's (¯gure 8). In equilibrium, the rate of capital embodied technological
progress accelerates.
Both the increased demand for °exible technologies and the increased frequency with
which ¯rms upgrade their capital lead to an increase in the size of the market for °exible
capital and raises the returnto R&D activities directedto improvingits productivity. As
a result, there is an increaseinthe rate of embodiedTFPgrowthof the sectors producing
°exible capital (i.e. computers and IT's in general). Gordon [1999] and Jorgenson and
Stiroh [1999] have recently shown that indeed the growth rate of various measures of
productivity in the IT producing sectors (sic 35) has been spectacular since the 1970's.
The restofthe paper is organizedas follows. Section2 presents the evolutionofembodied
and disembodied TFP growth and shows why the GPT approach is not consistent with
it. The model is presented in section 3 and I use it to analyze the impact of an increase
in uncertainty on the speed of di®usion of new technologies, the rate of embodied TFP
growth and the shift towards more °exible production processes. Section 4 is devoted
to illustrate the increase in uncertainty and test the implications of the uncertainty-
driven theory of the slowdown. Section 5 further discusses the GPT approach and some
extensions of this analysis for the service sector, the experience premium, the design of
organizations and the evolution of the stock market.
2 The decomposition of TFP growth
To understand the causes of the productivity slowdown it is useful to decompose TFP
growth into its embodied and disembodied components. According to Solow [1959] the
former can be introduced into the production process only through gross investment in
5new plant and equipment, while the latter make new and old capital goods equally more
productive. In this section I review two approaches to this decomposition and show that
the GPT theories where the slowdown is caused by the cost of implementing the new
technologies are inconsistent with the decomposition of TFP growth.6
2.1 The Solow-Nelson approach
Richard Nelson [1964] used variation in the average age of capital to identify the two
components of TFP in Solow's model. Nelson begins with the following production
function:









Here Y (t) represents output at time t and L(t) represents labor at time t. Capital goods
are distinguished by their vintage. K(v;t) denotes the amount of capital of vintage v at
date t (so that the age of the capital is t¡v). Technological progress comes in two forms.
®¸ is the rate of embodied technological progress. It is the contribution to TFP that
is associated with newer vintages of capital. µ is the rate of disembodied productivity
growth.
6In section 4.2 I use cross-sectional data to test related predictions of the implementation-based
GPT models. As we shall see, the results obtained are consistent with those obtained in section 2.3.
In section 5, I discuss the other type of GPT models where the slowdown is caused by the cost of
developing the new technologies and its complementary inputs (Helpman and Trajtenberg [1998]).








where Kt is the aggregate capital stock and Gt is the average age of capital.
Substitution of (2) into (1) leads to the following decomposition of TFP which makes













= ¯0i +¯1t +¯2Git (3)
where ¯1 = µ +¸® and ¯2 = ¡¸®:
Using annual data from 1953 to 1979 for thirteen2-digit manufacturingsectors, McHugh
and Lane [1987] test for structural breaks in (3).10 Their main ¯nding is that the
7The approximations conducted in this section follow Nelson [1964] who argues that they are ex-































8Nelson also includes a correction for cyclical variations in TFP due to labor hoarding or capital
utilization.
9A similar approach is developed by Hobijn [1999]. He uses the time series variation in the investment
output ratio toidentify the rate of embodied TFP growth. Another interestingdi®erence between Hobijn
and the McHugh and Lane exercise is that Hobijn runs a regression for the aggregate economy instead
of using a sectorial panel. This approach has the advantage of being inmune to the reallocation of
embodied TFP from the industries that use to the industries that produce capital when this is adjusted
for quality .
10The excluded industries are tobacco (21), apparel (23) , lumber and wood (24), furniture and
7productivity slowdown in manufacturing was caused by a decline in the growth rate of
disembodied TFP beginning in 1974, while the rate of embodied technological change
actually accelerated in the post-73 period. More speci¯cally, the average growth rate of
embodied TFP prior to 1973 was of 1.5 percent, while after 1973 it has increased 0.6
percentage points. The rate of disembodied TFP growth, however, declined after 1973
from 2.9 percent to minus 0.2 percent (table 1).
2.2 The Jorgenson-Gordon approach
An alternative approach based on Jorgenson [1966] identi¯es the rate of embodied TFP
growth with the rate of decline of the quality adjusted price of new equipment in terms
of goods and services. To see why this is a sensible strategy consider an economy with
two sectors one producing e±ciency units of investment (i) and the other producing













where kx;t and lx;t denote the e±ciency units of capital and labor used at time t in
sector x. In this accounting framework, the measure of capital is adjusted for changes in
quality, so that embodied technological progress is subsumedinto the measure of capital.
A new machine is as productive as several old machines. Improvements in the quality
of capital show up in the relative productivity of the investment goods producing sector
and are captured by ~ ¸. Embodied technological progress is therefore ®~ ¸.
In a perfectly competitive environment the price of ct and it are equal to their respective
marginal costs of production:
Pc















¯xtures (25), printing and publishing (27), petrochemicals (29) and leather (31). They represent less
than 20 percent of the manufacturing value added. For data sources and details on the construction of
capital, and age series see McHugh and Lane [1987].
8where rt and wt denote the cost of capital and labor at time t: If there is perfect mobility
of the factors of production across sectors the factor prices are the same in both sectors
and the price of investment goods in terms of consumption (Pi
t=Pc
t) is equal to e¡~ ¸ t: We
can therefore compute the rate of embodied TFP growth from the rate of decline in the
relative price of investment goods.
Gordon(1990) hasconstructeda quality adjustedprice index forproducerdurableequip-
ment (PDE) which can be used to compute the relative price Pi
t=Pc
t : Hornstein-Krusell
[1996], Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997] and Greenwood, Herzcowitz and Krusell [1997]
estimate that on average the relative price of investment goods has declined 3 percent
per year between 1954 and 1973. The ¯rst two papers also estimate that the rate of
decline has increased by between 0.5 and 1 percentage points a year since 1973. This
represents a 25 percent increase in embodied technological progress, or an increase of
between 0.15 and 0.3 percentage points.
In summary, both approaches lead to the same conclusion: that the rate of embodied
technological progress has accelerated since the early 1970's and that the productivity
slowdown is completely explained by a decline in disembodied productivity growth.
Further, note that the acceleration of the rate of embodied TFP growth had also some
long-run component since it lasted long after the slowdown was over. To understand the
productivity slowdown weneeda model that canexplaintheevolution of its components.
2.3 The GPT approach and embodied technological change
According to the GPT approach, the advent of new general purpose technologies such
as information technologies ¯rst lowers productivity growth as ¯rms incur in the cost of
implementing the new technologies, and later raises productivity growth as the produc-
tive bene¯ts of these technologies become fully realized.11Intuitively, since it is investing
in new capital what initially makes a ¯rm relatively less productive, the GPT approach
associates the productivity slowdown with a decline in embodied technological progress.
To see this more precisely, consider the following speci¯cation for the evolution of pro-
ductivity which captures the implementation-based GPT literature. Denote the produc-
11Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997], Greenwood and Jovanovic [1998] and Hornstein and Krusell
[1996].












±o(t¡¹ v)+1 for v < ¹ v · t
e
µ
®t+^ ¸(v¡¹ v)+¸¹ v¡ ³n
±n(t¡¹ v)+1 for v ¸ ¹ v
; (4)
The new GPT arrives with vintage ¹ v. Prior to this moment, the e±ciency of capital
has grown over time at rate µ
®; and over the vintages at rate ¸: At t = ¹ v; ¯rms are not
acquainted with the new GPT and must learn how to use it before its advantages are
fully realized (i.e. ³i > 0; for i = o;n). ^ ¸ > ¸ ensures that the productivity under the
new GPT eventually surpasses the trend under the old GPT. ±i > 0 captures the idea
that as time goes by and the agents ¯gure out how to use the new GPT, the learning
cost disappears. The formulation in expression (4) is su±ciently rich to accommodate
negative externalities from the new GPT to the productivity of the old vintages (³o ¸ 0)
and di®erent speeds of integration of the new GPT in the production process with the
old and the new vintages (±n 6= ±o).







where v0 > 0 is the ¯rst vintage v for which K(v;t) is positive.
To mimic the Solow-Nelson approach, expression (4) is plugged into the production














^ ¸(v¡¹ v)+¸¹ v¡
³n
±n(t¡¹ v)+1K(v;t)dv)®L(t)1¡® for t ¸ ¹ v
:
In the appendix (claim 1), I show that the result of this approximation is the following:
Y(t) '
½
e(µ+®¸)t¡®¸GtK(t)®L(t)1¡® for t < ¹ v
e(µ+®¹ ¸(t))t¡®~ ¸(t)GtK(t)®L(t)1¡® for t ¸ ¹ v
(5)
where ¸ > f¹ ¸(t); ~ ¸(t)g for an interval after the new GPT arrives.
The rate of embodied TFP growth is the elasticity of the level of TFP with respect to
the average age of capital. From equation (5) can be concluded that, with the arrival of
10the new GPT, the rate of embodied TFP growth declines from ®¸ to ®~ ¸(t). Note that
if ³i > 0; ~ ¸(t) is smaller than ¸ for an interval after ¹ v: This means that according to the
GPT approach there is a productivity slowdown if and only if there is a decline in the
rate of embodied TFP growth. The implementation-based GPT models are therefore
inconsistent with the evidence presented above on the acceleration of the Solow-Nelson
rate of embodied TFP growth during the productivity slowdown. 12
There is a simple explanation for this inconsistency. According to the GPT theory,
the implementation of computers causes the slowdown. Investing in the new GPT is
particularly bad for productivity short after the arrival of the new GPT. Therefore a
reduction in the age of capital stock in the 70's is going to be re°ected in a smaller
increase in TFP than what used to be the case under the previous GPT. In other words,
the elasticity of TFP with respect to investment should decline in the 70's according to
the GPT approach. Yet, we know from McHughandLanethat it increasedsubstantially.
To explain the evolution of embodied and disembodied technological progress, it is nec-
essary to build a model in which the shock that causes TFP growth to slowdown makes
investing in new capital particularly productive. This is what I do in the next section.
3 Uncertainty and TFP growth.
The model presented in this section analyzes the e®ect of uncertainty on the °exibility
of capital and on the speed of di®usion of technologies. In a more uncertain business
environment, old capital becomes obsolete. This generates the productivity slowdown
and the short-run acceleration of the relative productivity of new vs. old capital docu-
mented by McHugh and Lane [1987]. Uncertainty also enhances the speed of di®usion
of technologies and the long-run rate of embodied technological progress documented by
Greenwood and Yorukoglu [1997] and Hornstein and Krusell [1996].
12Note however that, if the future increase in productivity is su±ciently large, the learning-based
GPT models could be consistent with the acceleration of the rate of decline of the quality adjusted
relative price of new capital (i.e. the Jorgenson-Gordon rate of embodied TFP growth).
113.1 The di®usion of product-speci¯c capital
Consider a ¯rm that rents capital to produce output. This capital comes in many
designs, each of which is characterized by three attributes: its productivity, the product
that it is optimally designed to produce, and its °exibility. In a frictionless world, the
¯rm would always rent the design perfectly suited to its output. I assume, however, that
there is a cost of adopting new designs so that ¯rms upgrade their capital infrequently.
The rest of this section is devoted to describing the costs and bene¯ts of this adoption
decision.
New vintages of capital are more productive than old vintages of capital. The produc-
tivity of a machine developed at date ¿ is e
~ ¸¿: The output produced at date t with kt;¿




where ® 2 (0;1):
The ¯rm faces an uncertain environment, because the unique product demanded by
consumers evolves stochastically.13 More speci¯cally, the ¯rm's output yt;¿ is character-
ized by a continuum of attributes rj with j 2 [0;1]. The characteristics that consumers
demand evolve over time. In particular, each of the rj follows an independent driftless
Brownian motion with in¯nitesimal variance equal to ¾2.
Machines are optimally designed for the production of one speci¯c set of characteristics,
which I will call the template. It is costly to produce a product that deviates from this
standard. But, since from time t; the expected demanded at t + s is the same as the
demanded product at t; a ¯rm that upgrades its capital at t will set the template equal
to the demanded product that instant: Over time, if the machine design is not altered,
the product that consumers demand will diverge from the template. After s periods
the jth characteristic will diverge by rj;t+s ¡ rj;t. I assume that the cost of operating a
13All the results obtained in this paper generalize to other sources of uncertainty like variation in the
prices of the inputs used in production (i.e. supply side) or in the mix of goods produced (i.e. other
demand side speci¯cations).





2 dj = s¾
2
I will refer to d as the distance between the demanded product and the template.14
Some production systems are more °exible than others. Flexible capital is more easily
employed to produce products that deviate from the template. Flexibility is captured
by a parameter f which must be chosen at the time the ¯rm adopts a new design. The
more °exible a machine, the higher is f. The cost of operating a machine depends on
its °exibility and the distance of demand from the template. Let C(t;d;f) denote this
costs. We have
C(t;d;f) = (a(f) ed +cm(f))e¸t
where a0(¢) < 0; a00(¢) > 0, c0
m(¢), c00
m(¢) > 0 and limf!1 c00
m(f) > 0. a(f)ed represents the
cost of operating a machine to produce a product that di®ers from the template by d
units. It is decreasing in °exibility. cm(f) represents the cost of maintaining the capital.
It is increasing in °exibility. e¸t scales the operating cost so that it does not become
insigni¯cant in the long run.
If the ¯rm could, it would always want to rent a machine that was built to produce
the precise characteristics that consumers demand. To prevent this, I assume that in
order to adopt machines designed to produce a di®erent bundle of characteristics, the
¯rm must pay a ¯xed cost equal to Ace¸t: This cost represents the costs of learning to
work with the new design. Given this adoption cost ¯rms will upgrade their capital
infrequently. moreover, since the cost is independent of the size of the upgrade, ¯rms
will always upgrade to the most productive available capital.
The ¯rm chooses the amount of capital to rent, the dates at which to upgrade its
templates, and the °exibility of the upgrade in order to maximize pro¯ts. Future pro¯ts











14Note that by assuming a continuum of characteristics this distance depends only on the variance
of demand and the time since the machine was adopted. Assuming a single characteristic would have
resulted in a state dependent rule.
13Here ¼t;Ti = yt;Ti ¡ pk kt;Ti, pk is the rental price of capital, Ti represents the adoption
times, and fi denotes the associated choices of °exibility. Note that ½ must be greater
than ¸ for the problem to be well de¯ned.





























where ¸ ´ ®~ ¸
1¡®:
The ¯rst order condition with respect to Ti is:
Marginal Cost of Delay
z }| {
[¼ ¡ a(fi) ¡ cm(fi)]¡
h











¾2 ¡ ½+ ¸
+ Ac(½ ¡ ¸)
| {z }
Marginal Bene¯t from Delay
The left-handside of this expression represents the costs that the ¯rm incurs by delaying
the decision to upgrade its capital. By delaying an instant, the ¯rm does not enjoy the
higher net pro¯ts associated with a more sophisticated technology that is better suited
to the product that consumers demand. The right-hand side represents the bene¯ts
of delay. By delaying the adoption decision, the new capital will be marginally more
advanced and its template will be marginally closer to the demanded products. These
e®ects correspond to the ¯rst and second terms of the RHS of (7). The third term
represents the bene¯t of postponing the adoption costs.
14The ¯rst order condition with respect to fi is:








½ ¡ ¸¡ ¾2
| {z }
Marginal Value of Flexibility
(8)
The °exibility of the manufacturing system is determined by the balance between the
higher costs of maintaining °exible production systems and the lower cost of adopting
°exible systems to a changing environment.
Equations (6), (7), and (8) characterize the solution to the ¯rm's problem. In the next
subsection, I study the steady state properties of this system.
3.2 Steady state analysis
The steady state of this economy is de¯ned as a situation where the di®usion lags and
the degree of °exibility are constant (i.e. 4Ti ´ Ti ¡ Ti¡1 = 4¹ T and fi = ¹ f; 8i). For a
given rate of technological progress (¸) and level of uncertainty (¾2), equations (A) and
(F) de¯ne the steady state levels of 4¹ T and ¹ f.
Net Marginal Cost of Delay
z }| {
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= 0 (F)





plane. I show in the appendix that both equations describe positive
relationships between 4 ¹ T and f (claim 2). According to equation (A), if capital is
more °exible, then deviations from the template are less costly, and the ¯rm chooses to
upgrade its capital less often. This relationship is illustrated by the AA curve in ¯gure
2. According to equation (F), if the ¯rm is upgrading less often, the value of °exibility
15increases since there is more time for desired product characteristics to deviate from the
template. The FF curve in ¯gure 2 illustrates this relationship.
Sometime at the end of the 60's or the beginning of the 70's the uncertainty faced by
the ¯rms increased substantially. We can use the model to show the e®ect of an increase
in uncertainty on the °exibility and the speed of di®usion of technologies (i.e. 1
4¹ T). In
a more uncertain world, the distance between the template and the demanded product
will, ceteris paribus, increase faster. This means that the return from upgrading capital
more frequently raises and, as a result, the di®usion lags are reduced. As shown in
¯gure 3, this implies that the AA locus shifts to the right. For a given speed of di®usion,
uncertainty raises the marginal value of °exibility and ¯rms implement more °exible
production systems. This translates into a shift to the right of the FF curve. As can
be observed from ¯gure 3, the impact of uncertainty on °exibility and on the speed of
di®usion is ambiguous.
Firms have two ways to react to the higher uncertainty: increasing the °exibility of
the manufacturing systems and upgrading more frequently their template by installing
new equipment. If uncertainty has a very large impact on the net marginal value of
°exibility and the net marginal cost of delay is very sensitive to the degree of °exibility
it may be the case that an increase in uncertainty is followed by an increase in °exibility
and in the di®usion lags. Conversely, if a higher uncertainty reduces very much the
di®usion lags and the net marginal value of °exibility is very sensitive to the faster
di®usion of technologies, then an increase in uncertainty might accelerate the speed of
di®usion and reduce the °exibility of the production systems. In less extreme situations,
however, ¯rmswill react toanincrease inuncertainty bothby implementing more°exible
production processes and by adopting more frequently the state of the art technology.
This intuition can be formalized with the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exist two numbers ¹ c0
m¾ and ¹ a0
¾ such that if c0
m(:) is bounded below
by ¹ c0
m¾ and ¡a0(:) is bounded above by ¡¹ a0
¾ an increase in uncertainty will increase the
°exibility and the speed of di®usion. This restriction will be denoted as condition 1.
Proof. : See appendix A.1.
As we shall see, the view implied by condition 1 seems to be consistent with the US
16experience. In section 4.3, I show that uncertainty has had a positive e®ect on the speed
of di®usion of computers in US manufacturing. There is also a large body of evidence
showing that since the 1970's the production processes have become more °exible (Piore
and Sabel [1984], OTA [1984] and Milgrom and Roberts [1990]). Based on these results
I assume for the rest of the paper that condition 1 holds.
A second exercise that has received some attention is to study the e®ect of the rate
of technological progress (¸) on the speed of di®usion.15 An increase in ¸ raises the
net marginal cost of delaying adoption because the bene¯ts of moving to the frontier
technology are greater. Therefore, for a given level of °exibility, the di®usion lags will
be shorter in the economy with faster technological progress. As illustrated in ¯gure 4,
this implies that the AA locus shifts to the right with ¸. This e®ect has beenhighlighted
by Chari and Hopenhayn [1991]. In my framework, however, since the cost associated
with the divergence between the template and the demanded product is increasing in
¸; technological progress also a®ects directly the value of °exibility. In particular, for
a given speed of di®usion, I show in the appendix that an increase in ¸ raises the net
marginal value of °exibility (claim 3). As shown in ¯gure 4, this implies that the FF
locus also shifts to the right with ¸:
As with the e®ect of uncertainty, the resulting impact of technological progress on 4¹ T
and f is ambiguous. As above, this ambiguity can be ¯xed by bounding the elasticity
of the net marginal value of °exibility with respect to the speed of di®usion and the
elasticity of the net marginal cost of delay with respect to °exibility.
Proposition 2 There exist two numbers ¹ c0
m¸ and ¹ a
0
¸ such that if c0
m(:) is bounded below
by ¹ c0
m¸ and ¡a0 (:) is bounded above by ¡¹ a
0
¸ an increase in the rate of technological
progress raises the °exibility and the speed of di®usion. This restriction will be referred
to as Condition 2.
Proof. : See appendix A.1.
The loci AA and FF can be subsumed into the locus AF in ¯gure 5. AF represents
the equilibrium di®usion lag consistent with all the possible levels technological progress
(¸). Under condition 2, technological progress has a negative e®ect on the di®usion lags;
15See Rosenberg [1976] and Chari and Hopenhayn [1991].




plane. Moreover, under condition
1, uncertainty reduces the di®usion lag, for any given ¸: This implies that an increase
in uncertainty shifts AF to the left. These properties shall be useful to understand the
interaction between technological progress and the speed of di®usion. Before conducting
this analysis, I must put the ¯rms problem in an equilibrium framework by endogenizing
the rate of technological progress and the rental price of capital. The next section
addresses this issue.
3.3 Endogenous technological change
To close the model, I need to specify a production function for capital, the possible uses
of labor and the structure of the R&D process.
Capital is produced by combining a continuum [0,1] of intermediate good varieties. To
produce capital of a given vintage ¿; only the intermediate goods of vintage ¿ or earlier
can be used. In particular, the technology for producing e±ciency units of vintage ¿












where xj¿ is the amount of intermediate goods of the jth variety developed before time
¿, Aj¿ · e¸¿ is the associated productivity level of this variety and ¯ 2 (0;1). Both
intermediate goods and capital depreciate instantaneously. Capital is sold in a perfectly
competitive market.
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with measure L. Labor has two
competing uses. A measure n of the agents tries to develop improved versions of the
intermediate goods. They are the innovators. Alternatively, an agent can also manage a
¯nal good ¯rm. Managers earn the pro¯ts made by their ¯rms. Innovators are granted
perpetual patents over their innovations and use them to collect monopolistic rents
from the sale of the intermediate goods that embody them. Intermediate goods can be
duplicated at a ¯xed marginal cost of c units of ¯nal output.
Innovations randomly arrive with a Poisson arrival rate that depends on the intensity
18of R&D. In particular, when nj innovators try to improve the productivity of the jth
intermediate good, the arrival rate is ¸(nj); where ¸0 > 0 and ¸00 < 0: Innovations incor-
porate the state of the art knowledge in society (Amax). Therefore, after an innovation
occurs at the jth variety, the productivity parameter of the jth intermediate good jumps
to Amax and becomes the leading edge technology. As equation (??) captures, the rate




The productivity of the leading edge technology (Amax) and equation (9) can be used to






























Amax: As shown in Aghion andHowitt [1997], aj¿ is distributed at thesteady








This implies that, to produce kv units of capital of vintage v, it will be used x(¿;v) units














where p(i) is the price charged for the intermediate good with relative productivity i
16The law of motion of knowledge could take any other functional form at the only cost of changing
the ergodic distribution of relative productivities.






















Equation (12) can be integrated over all the capital vintages (D) that use this interme-
diate good to obtain the instantaneous aggregate demand faced by the producer of an























A monopolist innovator facing this demand and a constant marginal cost c will set a
price p = c
¯: In a perfectly competitive market for capital, the price of capital is equal



















The expressions for pk and p together with (13) de¯ne the demand faced by a successful
innovator as a function of her intermediate good's vintage and the measure of ¯rms that
demand it.
In steady state, ¯rms upgrade their capital with frequency
1
4¹ T: This generates a grad-
ual in°ow of ¯rms into the pool of users of capital that embodies a newly developed
intermediate good and also a gradual out°ow from this pool when a superior innovation
arrives. The speedof di®usion of technologies (1=¢¹ T) has a direct e®ect on the intensity
of these °ows. When ¯rms upgrade their capital more frequently, both the in°ow and
17This speci¯cation captures two situations depending on whether x(¿;v) is increasing or decreasing
in v. In the ¯rst (¯ > 0:5), the users of capital vintages closer to ¿ demand more vintage-¿ intermediate
good: In the second (¯ < 0:5), the demand of the vintage-¿ intermediate goods is larger from the users of
more distant capital (i.e. larger v). In the intermediate case (¯ = 0:5); the demand of the intermediate
good only depends on the productivity of the intermediate good (¿) and is independent of the capital
vintage (v).
20the out°ow will be more intense. However, the faster in°ow exactly cancels with the
faster out°ow and the total demand that faces an innovator is independent of the speed
of di®usion of technologies (¯gure 7). Nevertheless, with a faster speed of di®usion of
technologies the demand is concentrated earlier in time and since time is discounted at
the rate ½, the present discounted demand will be increasing in the speed of di®usion
of technologies.18;19 Let's denote the expected present discounted value of demand faced
by an innovator of a ¿¡vintage intermediate good by e¸¿Â(¢¹ T):
Innovators earn a margin (1¡®
® )c per intermediate good sold. The measure of ¯rms is
equal to L¡ n, and the marginal probability of being successful at the jth intermediate
good when there are nj innovators working at improving this variety is ¸0(nj): The
























The value of being an entrepreneur from ¿ onwards is ¦¿ ´ e¸¿ R 1
¿ ~ ¼e¡(½¡¸)(t¡¿)dt; where
~ ¼e¸¿ are the average instantaneous pro¯ts net of the cost of uncertainty and theadoption
costs. The opportunity cost of innovation activities at time ¿ is therefore ~ ¼e¸¿; where
~ ¼ is decreasing in ¾2 and Ac. At any interior equilibrium, the expected value of an
innovation is equal to its opportunity cost. In equilibrium, the value of innovating is
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18More formally, it is easy to show that for any time ¿ where innovation 2 (superior to innovation 1) is
developed, a. the total cumulative demand of innovation 1 is independent of ¢ ¹ T and b. the cumulative
demand of innovation 1 at time t (cd(t)) is decreasing in ¢ ¹ T (i.e.
@cd(t)
@¢ ¹ T · 0; 8t; and strictly negative
8t where the demand is strictly positive). If ½ > 0; it follows immediately that Â(¢ ¹ T
¡
):
19In this simple model the positive impact of the speed of di®usion of technologies on the value of
innovations comes from the time-discounting. More generally, there are more substantial mechanisms
that might strengthen this result. If there is imitation, most of the bene¯ts from innovating will be
accrued shortly after the innovation is developed and a fast di®usion of the innovation may greatly
enhance the pro¯ts that it generates.
21When technology di®uses faster (i.e. 4¹ T is reduced), the present discounted demand
faced by an innovator is also larger and the expected return to developing an improve-
ment in capital raises. Agents react to this by °owing to the R&D sector, and in
equilibrium the measure of innovators (n) increases. Equation (L) de¯nes, therefore, a
negative relationship between 4 ¹ T and n which is represented in ¯gure 5 as LL: Equa-
tions AF and L determine the measure of innovators (n) and the size of the di®usion
lags (4T).
Following an increase in uncertainty, LLshifts to the left because the opportunity cost of
innovation activities falls (see ¯gure 6). The AF locus shifts to the right because, from
condition 1, the net value of adopting a better and more appropriate machine increases.
If L is steeper than AF,20 higher uncertainty implies shorter di®usion lags and higher
rate of technological progress.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In a more uncertain environment tech-
nology di®uses faster. This raises the present discounted demand faced by innovators
and therefore the value of innovations. Uncertainty also accelerates the rate of diver-
gence between templates and demanded products reducingthe value of managing a ¯rm.
Both mechanisms increase the incentives to conduct R&D activities. In equilibrium, the
rate of technological progress is higher in a more uncertain environment and technology
di®uses faster. Since technological progress is embodied in new capital, a given amount
of investment in physical capital will lead to a larger increase in productivity in the more
uncertain environment than in the less uncertain environment. This is precisely the way
Nelson identi¯es an acceleration in embodied TFP growth.
The model also predicts that uncertainty accelerates the rate of embodied TFP growth
when this is identi¯ed following the Jorgenson-Gordon approach. To see this, note that
the price of a ¯nal good has been normalized to 1. The rental price of a physical unit
capital is pk units of ¯nal good: A unit of capital at time t is as productive as e¸t units
of capital at time 0. Therefore, the price of an e±ciency unit of capital at t in terms
20If the locus AF is steeper than LL the equilibrium is not stable. To see this note that, if an
entrepreneur decides to become an innovator there are going to happen two things. On the one hand,
the size of the market for innovations declines by one, and value of an innovation falls. On the other,
the size of the innovation will also raise. This enhances the speed of di®usion of technologies and as
a result the value of an innovation. If AF is steeper than LL, this second channel is stronger than
the ¯rst, and therefore the former entrepreneur will be better o® working as an innovator. Hence the
equilibrium was not stable.
22of the ¯nal good is pk e¡¸t: According to the Jorgenson-Gordon approach, the rate of
embodied TFP growth is the rate of decline of the relative price of an e±ciency unit of
capital times the capital share. That is exactly ®¸: Therefore, when ¸ raises due to the
increase in uncertainty so does the rate of embodied TFP growth.
At a more basic level, theevolution ofthe amount of resources devoted to R&D activities
has been consistent with the acceleration predicted by the uncertainty-driven theory. As
we shall see in section 4, there is strong evidence that the uncertainty of the business
environment increased at the end of the 60's or the beginning of the 70's. Figure 8
presents the evolution of the ratio of non-defense R&D expenditures to GDP for the G-7
countries between 1970 and 1992. In all of them there seems to be a signi¯cant positive
trend in the ratio. More speci¯cally, the increments since the mid 1970's have been
substantial ranging from a 14 percent in Germany to 47 percent in Italy. In the US the
ratio of non-defense R&D expenditures to GDP has risen from about 1.6 in 1973 to 2.1
in 1992. This represents a 27 percent increase. Therefore the timing of the increase in
uncertainty and of the increase in resources devoted to R&D activities seems to support
the predictions of the model.
After having shown that the uncertainty-driven approach explains the long-run accel-
eration of embodied TFP growth, the next section shows that it also accounts for the
deceleration of disembodied TFP growth.
3.4 Disembodied TFP-growth and short run dynamics
Up to now the analysis has been restricted to the steady state of the economy. How-
ever, the decline in the growth rate of TFP in manufacturing has been a transitory
phenomenon. To show that the uncertainty-driven approach accounts for the pattern
observed in ¯gure 1, it is necessary to study the adoption decision along the transition
fromthe low to thehighuncertainty steady state. Forsimplicity, the rateoftechnological
progress is assumed to be constant.21;22
21In the short run, this assumption may be defended by the relatively long gestation lags of new
technologies.
22Beyond this assumption, there are other reasons to interpret some of the results that I derive below
with caution in a general equilibirum context. In particular, during the interval when no ¯rm upgrades
its capital, there is a smaller net supply of ¯nal goods, because of the higher costs of operating capital,
23In the low uncertainty state, ¯rms adopt new technology with periodicity 4¹ Tl and the
°exibility of the installed capital is ¹ fl. At date ^ T uncertainty increases unexpectedly
from ¾2 to ^ ¾2. Firms react to this shock by modifying the technology upgrading plans
that they had made. The ¯rst order conditions of this reoptimization problem are given
by the following equations:
[¼ ¡ a(f^ {)¡ cm(f^ {)] ¡
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e(^ ¾2¡½+¸)4T^ {+1 ¡ 1
^ ¾2 ¡ ½+ ¸
(16)
where T^ { is the time of the ¯rst technological upgrade after ^ T and f^ { is the selected level
of °exibility.
The increase in uncertainty surprises ¯rms at di®erent stages in their adoption phase.
Some have just upgraded their technology while others were about to do it. Their
reaction to the more uncertain environment is also going to be heterogeneous. However,
it is easy toshow that this heterogeneity only lasts for one adoptionphase. After that, all
¯rms will adopt technologies with the periodicity and °exibility of the high uncertainty
steady state (i.e. 4¹ Th and ¹ fh; respectively).23 Equation (17) de¯nes a function between
the age of installed capital at ^ T and the length of the di®usion lag 4T^ {:
¼e
¡¸4T^ {¡ a(¹ fl)e
^ ¾2(T^ {¡^ T)+¾2(^ T¡T^ {¡1)¡ cm( ¹ fl) = ¼e
¡¸4 ¹ Th ¡ a(¹ fh)e
^ ¾24 ¹ Th ¡ cm(¹ fh): (17)
Figure 9 plots the distribution of di®usion lags for the transition period for a particular
parameterization described in appendix A.2.
From equation (15), ¯rms that upgraded their capital just before ^ T (i.e. T^ {¡1 = ^ T) will
renew it in less than 4¹ Th periods because installed capital is too in°exible for the new
environment. Therefore, uncertainty increases their net marginal cost of delay. Firms
but a constant demand of ¯nal output, because the amount of ¯nal output devoted to rent capital is
constant. Therefore, unless agents have linear preferences, the price of ¯nal output should increase
during this period.
23To see this, note that if 4T^ {+1 is equal to 4¹ Th and f^ { equals ¹ fh then equation (15) holds if condition
(17) holds. Note further that fi = ¹ fh and 4Ti+1 = 4 ¹ Th is by de¯nition of steady state consistent with
equations (7) and (16) for all i ¸ ^ {. Therefore the only binding condition is equation (17). But this will
always hold by selecting the appropriate adoption time T^ {.
24that were about to upgrade at ^ T (i.e. T^ {¡1 = ^ T ¡ 4¹ Tl) will delay adoption because
the expected distance in the next phase increases with uncertainty, and so does the
marginal value of delay. The adoption behavior of the other ¯rms falls in between these
two extremes. As a result, the distribution of adoption times is compressed.
The evolution of aggregate TFP is presented in ¯gure 10. The delay in upgrading at ^ T
generates an interval at which no ¯rm adopts new equipment. This reduces the level of
TFP because gross output remains constant while the costs of operating the equipment
(C(t;d;f)) increase over time. When ¯rms start to adopt new °exible capital the rate
of decline of net output decreases. Depending on the relative magnitude of the rate
of technological progress and the increase in uncertainty, TFP may continue to fall
(although at a slower rate) or may bounce back. This diversity of possibilities arises
because there are two forces operating in opposite directions. On the one hand, ¯rms
are starting to upgrade their technologies and renewing their templates. On the other,
for those ¯rms that have not upgraded since ^ T; the costs of operating equipment are
increasing because of the more rapidly changing environment. When this second force
dominates, TFP will continue to decline for a while. Eventually, a su±ciently large
number of ¯rms has upgraded the capital stock and make it more °exible. At this point,
aggregate TFP starts to grow.
After showing that the increase in uncertainty generates a decline in the rate of TFP
growth it is natural to wonder whether it can explain the short-run acceleration of the
Solow-Nelson rate of embodied TFP growth. This is studied next. In section 4.2, I show
that in the cross-section, investment in computers helped alleviate the slowdown during
the 70's. The last goal of this subsection is to show that the uncertainty-driven theory
can explain this fact very naturally.
Sinceinthe productionfunctionusedinthemodel there is nospillover acrossthe produc-
tivities of di®erent capital vintages, the rate of embodied TFP growth is approximately
proportional to the relative productivity of new vs: old capital. For illustrative pur-
poses, I approximate the productivity of new capital by the average level of TFP of the
25 percent of the ¯rms that have adopted new technology most recently. Analogously,
the productivity of old capital is calculated by the average over the 25 percent of the
¯rms that adopted new equipment least recently. These times series are plotted in ¯gure
11.
25At the time of the increase inuncertainty, the relative level of TFP of new vs. oldcapital
rises.24 As some ¯rms start to upgrade their capital stocks and make them more °exible
their productivity increases relative to those who have not upgraded yet. This increasein
the share of °exible capital explains the acceleration of embodied TFP growth along the
transition. Note that if the increase in uncertainty is su±ciently large, at this stage the
growth rate of TFP growthwill still be smaller than in the low uncertainty environment.
Therefore, the model explains the simultaneous decline in disembodied TFP growth and
acceleration of embodied found by McHugh and Lane [1987] and Hobijn [1999].
Production processes di®er in the elasticity of the costs of operating capital with respect
to °exibility and in the degree of development of the applications of the °exible tech-
nologies for the di®erent production processes. Both of these factors generate di®erences
in the intensity of investment in °exible technologies. To analyze the e®ect of °exible
technologies on the magnitude of the slowdown, consider two sectors one that is unable
to increase the °exibility of the manufacturing system and another that can by adopting
more °exible capital. Figure 12 illustrates the evolution of TFP growth for both sectors.
Being able to implement °exible equipment helps the ¯rm to reduce the higher costs of
operating machines associated with a more uncertain environment. Therefore, according
to the model, the implementation of °exible reduces the size of the slowdown.
The next subsection extends the steady state analysis to a multisectorial framework
to explain the spectacular performance of the information technologies (IT) producing
sectors.
3.5 A miracle in Silicon Valley
Robert Gordon [1999] has pointed the economists' attention towards the spectacular
productivity growth rates achieved by the IT producing sectors.25 Between 1973 and
1991 the average annual TFP growth rate in non-electrical machinery was 3.7 percent,
while between 1948 and 1973 had been only 0.8 percent. The ¯gures for total man-
24This is an uninteresting e®ect that appears because the cost of operating the equipment in a
changing environment are convex in the distance d. Therefore when no ¯rm adopts, the costs are going
to increase at the same rate for all the ¯rms, but the average over the ¯rms with higher costs (those
that adopted least recently) grows faster than the average over the ¯rms that adopted most recently.
25Most IT's are produced in the sectors classi¯ed under sic 35, that is non-electrical machinery.
26ufacturing were 2.2 percent between 1948 and 1973 and 1.3 between 1973 and 1991.
The comparison is even more spectacular when we focus only on computers. Gordon
reports that the annual growth rate of output per hour in the production of computers
between 1972 and 1995 was about 20 percent while for total manufacturing it was 2.58
percent. In this subsection I extend the model presented above to argue that an increase
in uncertainty may explain this fact.
I introduce three modi¯cations in the model. First, instead of a unique ¯nal good,
there are M: Consumers have symmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences de¯ned over the M
goods. The share of income allocated to each good is therefore 1
M: Second, instead of
a continuum of possible levels of °exibility, now there are only two ways to organize
production. With the °exible manufacturing system the degree of °exibility is ff while
with the non-°exible it is fnf (smaller than ff). The third and most important variation
is that technological progress capital is speci¯c to the °exibility of capital. This means
that innovations that enhance the productivity of the °exible capital cannot be adapted
to the non-°exible and viceversa.26 One implication is that the rates of technological
progress in °exible (¸f) and in°exible (¸nf) production systems will generally di®er.
Let's normalize every instant the value of nominal GDP to 1. From the Cobb-Douglas
assumption, this implies that nominal sectorial GDP (piyi) is equal to
1
M: It follows
immediately that the growth rate of the price at the ith sector (°pi) is equal to minus the
rate of technological progress at the ith sector. Since technology is common to all the
sectors using a given manufacturing system, °pi is equal to ¡¸f or to ¡¸nf depending
on whether the ith sector uses °exible or in°exible capital.
The growth rate of the general price level (°P) is an average of the growth rate of the
prices of the M products. Let shf denote the fraction of sectors using °exible capital.
Then °P is equal to:
°P = shf °pf + (1¡ shf) °pnf
= ¡¸nf ¡ shf (¸f ¡ ¸nf)
The growth rate of the relative price of °exible (°^ pf) and in°exible (°^ pnf) capital goods
are therefore equal to:
°^ pf = (1¡ shf) (¸nf ¡ ¸f)
26This is the only critical assumption in this section. The other two are just simplifying assumptions.
27°^ pnf = shf (¸f ¡ ¸nf)
Interms of the problem of the ¯rm, the only di®erence that these modi¯cations introduce
is that now there will be a trend in the relative price of the ¯nal good. This a®ects the
value of output over time. In particular, a positive trend in the relative price of a
product is equivalent to a reduction in the discount rate. Equation Ai; for i = f and
nf; expresses the ¯rst order condition associated with the selection of di®usion lags.
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As in the one sector model, equation Ai de¯nes a downwardsloping locus inthe 4 ¹ T ¡¸i
space. An interesting property of the Ai loci is that, for any given level of technolog-
ical progress, the cost of delay is higher when ¯rms use more in°exible equipment. In
graphical terms, this means that the Af locus is located to the right of the Anf locus
(see ¯gure 13).
Production processes di®er in how much °exibility is achieved by installing °exible cap-
ital. In some sectors the cost of having an inappropriate capital (i.e. one that is not
designedfor producing the demandedproduct)can be reducedsubstantially with°exible
capital while in others it may be quite insensitive to the °exibility of capital. As shown
in the one sector model, the value of °exibility increases with uncertainty. This makes
¯rms more willing to adopt °exible capital in a more uncertain environment. Therefore,
the fraction of sectors using °exible capital is increasing in the level of uncertainty (i.e.
shf(¾2
+ )).
In this capital-speci¯c world there are two R&D sectors; one that improves the produc-
tivity of °exible capital which employs a measure nf of innovators and another where
nnf innovators work to enhance the productivity of non-°exible capital. The return to
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28Equation Li de¯nes a negative relationship between 4¹ Ti and ni; for i 2 ff;nfg: Equa-
tions Af; Anf; Lf and Lnf characterize the equilibrium speeds of di®usion and rates of
technological progress for both types of technology. Proposition 3 describes the conse-
quences of an increase in uncertainty from ¾2 to ^ ¾2.
Proposition 3 There exists a positive number ¹ shf such that if shf(^ ¾2) > ¹ shf > shf(¾2);
¸f will be higher than ¸nf.
Proof. : See appendix A.1.
The intuition for this proposition is represented in ¯gure 14. In a more uncertain world,
¯rms want to adopt more often new equipment because installed equipment becomes in-
appropriate faster. Capital becomes more obsolete the more in°exible it is. In graphical
terms this translates into a shift of the Ai loci to the left, but the shift of the Anf locus
is larger. Uncertainty also reduces the value of a ¯nal output ¯rm and therefore the
opportunity cost of innovation. This second e®ect shifts to the right both Li loci. In a
world with speci¯c technological progress, an increase in uncertainty has a third e®ect of
the equilibrium. More speci¯cally, some ¯rms that in the low uncertainty environment
used in°exible capital now are going to implement °exible production systems. This
increase in the scale of the market for °exible capital enhances the return to innovation
in °exible equipment and reduces the value of innovations in in°exible. Graphically, this
third e®ect implies a shift to the right the Lf curve while the Lnf shifts to the left.
Iftheincrease inthe scale of the marketfor °exibleequipment is su±ciently largetherate
of technological progress embodied in °exible capital (¸f) will be higher than the rate
of technological progress embodied in in°exible (¸nf). In quality adjusted data sets like
Gordon's these improvements in e±ciency of capital show up in the productivity of the
technology-producer sectors like O±ce Computing and Accounting machines (OCAM)
where most IT's are manufactured. Therefore the increase in uncertainty can potentially
explain the spectacular TFP growth rate observed by Gordon and others in the sectors
that produce computers and in general IT's.
Next I turn to the empirics of the uncertainty-driven approach.
294 Testing the role of uncertainty and computers on
the slowdown
This section has two goals. First, it provides evidence of an increase in the uncertainty
of the business environment. Second, it tests several of the implications of the model
presented above. In particular, the e®ect of computers and uncertainty on the slowdown
and the impact of uncertainty on the speed of di®usion of computers.
4.1 Evidence on the increase in uncertainty
The cause of the productivity slowdown in the uncertainty-driven theory is the increase
in the uncertainty of the business environment. In the model presented in section 3, I
have used, for simplicity, aparticular source of uncertainty, namely, the characteristics of
the product demanded by the ¯rms. However, uncertainty can take many forms. Firms
may be uncertain about the future evolution ofvariables such as input and output prices,
market structure, technologies available, degree of liquidity, relative demand of each of
the products, trade tari®s, ... It is important to stress that the model could be rewritten
using these other sources of uncertainty and the predictions would be unchanged. What
is crucial for the main results is that 1. the e±ciency of the ¯rm is tied to some changing
attributes about the state of the world and 2. on average, as time goes by and the
managers do not respond to these changes in the state of the world, the e±ciency of the
¯rm declines. The ¯rst property yields the slowdown when uncertainty increases while
the second is su±cient for the acceleration of the adoption frequencies.
Inprinciple, there aretwoways to illustratethe increase in uncertainty. Oneis to identify
and measure the speci¯c sources of uncertainty. This strategy is partially pursued at
the end of this subsection. An alternative approach consists in tracking the evolution
of general measures of the uncertainty faced by the ¯rms. Next I propose three of these
general measures.
As Leahy and Whited [1996] argue, one proxy for the uncertainty faced by the ¯rms is
the volatility of the (monthly) stock returns. Asset returns should capture the e®ects
30of any aspect of a ¯rms's environment that investors deem important.27 The data on
stock returns for all the stocks in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ comes from the
CRSP data set. For each individual stock and decade I compute the standard deviation
of monthly returns, and then the average over all the stocks for each decade. Column
1 of table 2 illustrates an important increase in the average volatility of individual
stock returns which could be dated somewhere between the mid 60's and the mid 70's.
In manufacturing, this is mostly a within 4-digit sector phenomenon since 84% of the
sectors (representing around 90% of the manufacturing value added) experienced the
increase in uncertainty between the 1960's and the 70's. As shown in the rest of the
columns this ¯nding is robust to many variations.
Column 2 only considers those stocks with more than two years of data. Column 3
computes the median of the standard deviation of individual stock returns. Column 4
computes the average across stocks of the standard deviation of the deviations from a
stock and decade speci¯c time trend. Column 5 computes the average standard devia-
tion of yearly individual stock returns. This measure is probably more immune to fads,
bubbles and other non-fundamentals sources of return variability. Reassuringly, its pat-
tern is the same as in the other columns, therefore, one can conclude that the measured
increase in the volatility of asset returns mostly re°ects an increase in the uncertainty
of fundamentals.28
Another concern that might be raised is that the increase in measured uncertainty
might be due to an increase in the share of small (more volatile) ¯rms in the US stock
markets. To control for this composition e®ect columns 6 and 7 compute the average
standard deviation of individual stock returns for the ¯rms in sample in the 50's and
60's respectively. Note that this approach could a priori bias the results against the
increase in volatility because of a selection e®ect. Finally, column 8 reports standard
deviations of the individual stock returns weighted by the share in total capitalization
over the decade.
27One caveat is that movements in asset returns may be quite noisy, re°ecting not only changes in
fundamentals, but also bubbles, fads and the in°uence of noise traders. However, to the extent that
what matters for the theory is not the level of uncertainty but its evolution over time this should not
be an important concern.
28One could also argue that the increase in short term volatility is due to the faster trading methods
available since the 1970's. However, the increase in volatility is robust to the length of the periods over
which the returns are computed and this limits very much any potential concern about changes in the
trading technology.
31A second general measure of uncertainty can be obtained by studying the volatility of
the return to other factors of production, for example labor. Gottschalk and Mo±t
[1994] compute the standard deviation of the real wage rates for all the individuals in
the PSID during the 70's and 80's.29 They observe a 35 percent increase in the variance
of the logarithm of the weekly wage rate. The increased volatility is observed for all
education, experience and income levels both for workers that did and did not change
jobs. From a sectorial point of view, the higher volatility is mostly (88%) due to an
increase in the within 2-digit sectors wage rate volatility. Indeed, the average volatility
of real wage rates increases inall 2-digit sectors. Gottschalk and Mo±t [1994] also report
an important increase in the average volatility of hours worked which is also robust to
the same partitions of the data.
The third measure of uncertainty comes from the literature on job creation and destruc-
tion. The excess job reallocation rate measures the degree of simultaneous job creation
anddestruction in agiven industry. In thelight of thecanonical model of Mortensenand
Pissarides [1994], the excess job reallocation rate is a proxy for the variance of the value
of jobs. The data for excess job reallocation at the 2-digit level for manufacturing comes
from Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh [1997] and covers the period between 1973 and 1993.
Table 3 reports the existence of a strong positive trend in excess job reallocation when
the left hand side includes net employment growth (to control for its cyclical variability)
andsector speci¯c dummies. This upward trendis robust to di®erent weighting schemes.
Once illustrated the increase in the uncertainty of the business environment, the follow
upquestion concerns the forcesthat driveit. Thesemay bethe higher volatility of energy
prices, the movement to a °oating exchange-rate system (and the associated volatility
of relative prices), or the e®ect of globalization on the volatility of demand (both within
and across varieties) and on the market structure. To assess the relative importance
of these and other potential causes goes beyond the purposes of this paper, however, I
conduct a preliminary exploration at two levels. First, I try to explain the volatility of
stock returns at the 4-digit manufacturing sectors with some measures of openness and
of the intensity of adoption of new technologies. Second, I look directly at the volatility
of intermediate input and output prices to show that they become more volatile in the
70's.
29The exact periods are 1970-78 and 1979-87.
32Table 4 reports the contemporaneous correlation between several measures of openness
and investment in computers and stock market volatility at the four digit manufacturing
level. The degree of openness is measured by the degree of import penetration,30 the
ratio of exports to shipments and the sum of the two. The ¯rst three columns of table 4
show that the increment in the three variables is positively (and signi¯cantly) correlated
with the increment in the average volatility of individual stock returns at the 4-digit
manufacturing level. Nevertheless, the correlation between the increment in volatility
and the increment in computer share is weak and not statistically signi¯cant.
In table 5 and ¯gure 14, I study the 2-digit sectorial volatility in manufacturing of the
prices of energy, output and materials de°ated by some aggregate producers price index
for the whole economy. It is evident that in the 70's there was an important (and quite
permanent) increase in the volatility of manufacturing output and energy prices.
4.2 Contrasting the two theories
What was the e®ect of computers on the TFPslowdown? Did they cause it as suggested
by the GPT approach, or did they ease it, as predicted by the uncertainty-driven theory?
Ianswerthese questionsby testingthecross-sectionalimplications of the two approaches.
4.2.1 Did computers cause the Slowdown?
According to the GPT approach, the slowdown in the 70's is the consequence of the costs
associatedwith the adoptionof computers. It follows almost immediately that those sec-
30This equals value of imports divided by the sum of value of shipments and value of imports.
33tors which invest more intensively in computers should experience larger slowdowns.31;32
The uncertainty-driven approach predicts that the sectors with the °exible technologies
were developed , by using two proxies forthe intensity ofimplementationof the computer
technologies. The ¯rst is the Berman, Bound and Griliches [1994] share of computers
in total investment (BBG, henceforth) and the second is the share of expenditures in
O±ce, Computing and Accounting Machines (OCAM) in total investment (BEA [1975],
[1985] and BEA web site).
Suppose that the logarithm of TFP at the ith sector (tfpit) follows the law of motion
tfpit ¡ tfpit¡1 = °1 +°2cshit +²it; (18)
where cshit represents the share of computer expenditures in total investment at the ith
sector and ²it is an iid error term. Since I only have measures of csh for some years I
can aggregate (18) in the following way:
tfpitj ¡ tfpitj¡1 = °1 + °2d cshitj + vitj; (19)
where d cshitj denotes the average share of investment in computers at the ith sector
between the periods tj¡1 and tj; tfpitj ¡ tfpitj¡1 is the average growth rate of TFP in
31To see this, let Bi(cshi) = bi cshi denote the bene¯t derived, at sector i; from a share of investment
in computers cshi: This bene¯t takes place in the 80's. Let Ci(cshi) = C0i + c1i(cshi)° (° > 1) be the
cost associated with the same investment intensity in the 70's. A representative unit facing this cost





of total investment to computers, where ¯ is the discount factor.









: In particular Ci is
higher in those sectors with higher cshi:
In order to reach this conclusion I have assumed that C0i is uncorrelated with cshi: If the initial cost
of investing in computers was negatively correlated with the variables that determine the intensity of
investment the conclusion reached above would not be so unambiguous. Is this an important concern?
Not really. One may think of C0i as planning costs. I show below that there is no evidence on the
e®ect of planning costs on the slowdown. Second, the costs of using computers for certain basic tasks
like accounting, inventory management or building an intranet are probably very similar accross sectors
therefore C0i are not only small but also uncorrelated with the variables that determine cshi:
32Several authors have tested similar relationships. Morrison [1997] ¯nds that the rate of return to
o±ce and information technology capital in the 70's was very large, by the end of the 80's this had decline
and in the 90's it was large again. She uses 2-digit manufacturing data and her de¯nition of o±ce and
information technology equipment is more inclusive than mine because she also considers investment in
communications equipment and scienti¯c and engineering instruments. Chun [2000] pools data from 47
2-digit industries both in services and manufacturing from 1960 to 1997 and ¯nds an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the share of OCAM capital in total capital and the log of TFP. This is consistent
with Morrison [1997] and with my ¯ndings if, as it is the case, the share of OCAM capital was relatively
low in the 70's.
34this interval and vitj is an iid error term. In the ¯rst two columns of table 6, I estimate
this regression in a cross-section of the 4-digit manufacturing sectors33 with tj = 1980
and tj¡1 = 1973 and d cshitj approximated by the computer share in 1977 as measured by
BBG and the BEA. The results for the proxies are very similar and, in both, computers
seem to have a very strong and highly signi¯cant positive e®ect on TFP growth.
There are several potential problems that this exercise may su®er and that prevent me
to interpret the relation between computers and TFP as causal at this stage. The ¯rst
is that the share of computers expenditures over total investment might be endogenous.
This concern is clearly much less important than if the regressor used was the total
investment in computers. Yet, it still might be the case that because computers were a
relatively risky investment in the 70's, those sectors with more liquidity (and probably
also higher TFP growth rates) were more prone to undertake these investments. At
¯rst glance, one trouble that this objection encounters is that if investing in computers
was relatively risky, there should be a positive correlation between computer share and
the sectorial volatility of the stock returns. However, above I have shown that this
correlation is insigni¯cant.
To make sure that the e®ect of TFP growth on the composition of investment is not
driving the coe±cients in the ¯rst two columns of table 6, I instrument the computer
share in 1977 with the computer share in 1967 (columns 3 and 4) and with the average
sectorial standard deviation of the stock returns in the 60's (columns 5 and 6). Past
investment shares in computers are a priori a good instrument because the degree of
liquidity in 1977 should not be a®ected by the share of investment in computers in 1967
provided the very small share that these represented.34 The volatility of stock returns in
the 60's is also a good instrument because 1. as the model predicts and we shall see in
the next subsection, uncertainty accelerates the speed of di®usion of computers and 2.
as we will see below, for this measure of uncertainty and TFP-growth are uncorrelated.
From columns 3to 5itis clearthat the positivee®ect thatcomputers hadonTFPgrowth
in the 70's is very robust to the instrumentation and therefore the share of computers
in investment is not endogenous.
The secondeconometric problem that may face regression (18) is that the error structure
33The data on TFP comes from the NBER manufacturing database (Bartelsman and Gray [1996]).
34For OCAM, which is a larger set, the average share in total investment in 1967 was about 5 percent.
35may be missespeci¯ed. If ²it = °i + "it; where °i is a sector-speci¯c component of TFP
growth, the estimated e®ect of computers on TFP growth might be inconsistent. To see
this suppose that those sectors that on average have higher TFP growth rates (i.e. high
°i)are thosethatinvestmore intensively incomputers (i.e. cov(d cshi;°i) = c° > 0). Then
the plim ^ °2 = °2+c° which can be positive even with °2 negative: To get rid of the ¯xed
e®ects term I di®erentiate (19).35 In column 7 of table 6 we can see that, after correcting
for the ¯xed e®ects, computers still have a major impact on TFP growth. Therefore I
conclude that the increase in computer usage reduced the productivity slowdown in the
70's. It is hard to reconcile this result with the implementation-based GPT models of
the productivity slowdown.
The proponents of the GPT theory might still argue that the relevant costs in the
implementation of computers are the costs of planning how to adapt the production
processes to the new technologies. If this is the case, the current share of investment in
computers might be a poor proxy for the intensity of the current planning costs. These
however, should be positively correlated with the share of investment in computers in
the future. In column 8 of table 6 I show that the sectors that increased by more the
investment share of computers in the 80's did not experienced larger declines in TFP
growth in the 70's. Therefore, the cost of planning the investment in computers did not
cause the slowdown.
4.2.2 Did uncertainty cause the slowdown?
The uncertainty-driven approach argues that an increase in the uncertainty faced by the
¯rms caused the slowdown. Moreover, as shown in section 3.4, those sectors where the
°exible technologies were more available should use them to dampen the negative e®ect
of uncertainty.
To test these predictions I use the following speci¯cation
gtfpi70 ¡ gtfpi60 = °1(ui70 ¡ ui60)+ (20)
°2(cshi77 ¡ cshi67) +vi70
35That means that the dependent variable is the di®erence between the average TFP growth rate
during 1973-80 and 1958-73, and the independent variable is the di®erence between the conputer share
in investment in 1977 and 1967.
36which takes care of sector-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects in the growth rates. gtfpix is the average
growth rate of TFP in sector i during decade x; uix is the sectorial uncertainty in decade
x, cshix is the share of investment in computers in year x, and vi70 is an iid error term.
In the estimation of equation (20) I use three di®erent measures of uncertainty all of
them at the 4-digit aggregation level. These are the average standard deviation of
stock returns, the standard deviation of the growth rate of shipments and the standard
deviation of tfp growth. The intensity of investment on °exible technologies is proxied
by the share of investment in OCAM over total investment as measured by the BEA.
The ¯rst three columns of table 7 report the basic results. First, computers have an
strong and positive e®ect on TFP-growth during the slowdown. This means that, as
predicted by the uncertainty-driven approach, they alleviated the slowdown. Second,
for two out of the three measures of uncertainty, there is a strong negative e®ect of
uncertainty on TFP-growth during the slowdown.
One might be concerned that sectors with low TFP-growth rates are more volatile (i.e.
uncertainty is endogenous) and this generates the negative coe±cient in columns 2 and
3 in table 7. Yet, the relationship between TFP growth and the two measures of uncer-
tainty used in these columns is positive as re°ected in columns 4 and 5, where I estimate
this relationship pooling the data for the three decades (60's, 70's and 80's).36 Hence
it was the increase in uncertainty what generated the slowdown and not the other way
around.
Finally, theuncertainty-driventheory also predicts thatthe negative e®ectof uncertainty
on TFP-growth will be milder in the 80's and 90's because by then many ¯rms will have
adopted the °exible technologies. This result is con¯rmed empirically in columns 6 and
7 of table 7.
36The same results are obtained by estimating the relationship for each individual decade.
374.3 Does Uncertainty accelerate di®usion?
According to the uncertainty-driventheory, uncertainty accelerates the speedof di®usion
of new technologies (proposition 1).37 To test this prediction, I build a panel at the four
digit manufacturing level. The typical regression that I run takes the form:
cshit = ®0 + ®1sdit¡1;t¡10 + ²it
where thedependentvariable is the share ofcomputers on total investment and measures
the speedof di®usion of technologies,38 while sdit¡1;t¡10 is the average standarddeviation
of the stock returns in the previous decade and measures uncertainty. The use of this
lagged e®ect is very natural provided that the model developed above generates slow
di®usion of technologies. Moreover, it is a way of avoiding the potential endogeneity of
uncertainty, although above it has been shown that, contemporaneously, the increase in
uncertainty and in computer share are very weakly correlated.
The regressions reported in table 8 di®er in the assumptions made about the error term
²it: In the ¯rst two columns, I use a random e®ects estimator to show that uncertainty
accelerates the speed ofdi®usion of computers both for the BEA and the BBG measures.
In the model presented in section 3, technology di®uses linearly, however there is a large
body of evidence showing that the di®usion of technologies follows S-curves (Griliches
[1957], Davies [1979]). In this case, the speed of di®usion should depend of the date at
which technology is available and on the ceiling of the di®usion process. Since in the ¯rst
two columns I am using cross-sectional variation, the positive impact of uncertainty of
the speed of di®usion might be caused by the fact that high uncertainty sectors started
adopting computers earlier or have a higher ceiling (Griliches [1957]).
In columns 3 and 4, I use only time series variation by introducing sector speci¯c dum-
mies. Thisshouldtake care ofcross-sectional di®erences inavailabilitydates andceilings.
As predicted in section 3.3, uncertainty still has a strong and signi¯cant e®ect on the
speed of di®usion of computers. Therefore, the acceleration associated with uncertainty
goes beyond the normal acceleration that would be observed due to the S-curve pattern.
37In a recent paper, Rich and Tracy [1999] show that uncertainty reduces the duration of employment
contracts.
38Note that, if the level of di®usion of a technology z (Xz) is de¯ned as the capital stock of z (Kz)






is equal to vz = Iz
I ; when S
is measured by the level of investment at the sector (I) and this does not vary too much.
385 Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed an explanation for the evolution of TFP growth in manu-
facturing. According to the uncertainty-driven approach, during the 70's the business
environment became more uncertain. The existing capital was too in°exible to cope
with a rapidly changing environment and its productivity declined generating a produc-
tivity slowdown. Firms reactedto the increase in uncertainty by investing innew °exible
capital that could be adapted to the new environments. The higher adaptability made
possible that new capital retained its productivity. As a result, the rate of embodied
productivity growth accelerated.
I have also shown thatthe slowdown was not caused by thearrival ofa new GPT. Bothin
the cross-section and in the time series, the elasticity of TFP with respect to investment
in new equipment was specially high in the 70's. I have also noticed that it is very hard
to rationalize these facts with a model that emphasizes the costs of implementing the
new technologies as the cause of the slowdown.
There is one scenario where the new GPT could have caused the slowdown and still be
consistent with this evidence. In this scenario is one where the relevant cost is not an
implementation cost but a development cost as in Helpman and Trajtenberg [1998]. If
this is the case, the 70's should have witnessed a very large decline in TFP growth in
the sectors that develop the new GPT and its secondary innovations. These are mainly
localized in sic 35 (non-electrical machinery ). However, as reported in section 3.5, this
sector has experienced almost miraculous growth rates of TFP and productivity since
the 70's.
Computers (and more generally IT's and PA machinery) are a crucial element in my
story. Inthis sense, this paper is not a criticism to the GPT literature ingeneral but only
to the explanations of the slowdown based on the costs of implementing the GPT. In
this broader literature, this paper provides an explanation for the rapid development and
di®usion of the new GPT. One in which the development of the new GPT is endogenous.
This view argues that the returnfrom developing and adopting thePA's and information
technologies increased as uncertainty raised. The empirical section has supported this
hypothesis.
39The increase in the uncertainty of the business environment has other implications that
I plan to pursue in future research. Some of them are quite straightforward. The last
two decades have witnessed unprecedented rates of return in the stock market that
followed a very poor performance in the 70's. The latter can naturally be accounted by
the e®ect that uncertainty had on the productivity of old capital while the former may
be a consequence of the acceleration in the speed of di®usion of technologies and the
associated acceleration of embodied TFP growth.
Katz and Murphy [1992] have shown that the experience premium increased dramati-
cally during the 70's and specially in the 80's. If more experienced workers have longer
information histories they will be able to cope better with a rapidly changing environ-
ment. That is particularly true if the relevant information is idiosyncratic and it is not
di±cult to codify. Interestingly, the volatility of individual stock returns increased dur-
ing the 80's relative to the volatility of aggregate stock returns like the S&P500 or the
whole stock market.
The increased in idiosyncratic uncertainty may have implications for the design of the
¯rms and the process of decision making. Management scientist have detected a trend
towards less hierarchy and more °exible organizational forms. This move encompasses
more autonomy and responsibility being awarded to workers and their performing a
wider range of tasks (Caroli [1998]). Therefore, organizational change has led to more
decentralization in work organization. With an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty the
information which is idiosyncratic to the client becomes more important. To the extent
that information cannot be transmittedperfectly, in the rapidly changing environment it
will be optimal to delegate certaindecisions to the periphery of the organization. There-
fore, the change in the composition of uncertainty may help explain the transformation
of organizations.
Finally, to understand the evolution of aggregate TFP growth it is necessary to explain
why productivity has beengrowing so slowly inthe service sectors for the last twenty ¯ve
years. The main problem with services is that it is di±cult to write down a conceptually
accurate production function. Probably, some advance can be made by recognizing the
importance of the information in the production of services. As uncertainty increases,
information becomes less accurate and the value of some services may decline. This
may help explain why the return from introducing improvements in the production of
40services has been so low since the 1970's.
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45A Appendix
The appendix is divided in two parts. The ¯rst contains the proofs of the claims and
propositions made in the text. The second describes the calibration of the model used
for the computation of the transition path in section 3.4.
A.1 Proof of Propositions
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where K<¹ v(t) ´
R ¹ v
v0 K(v;t) and K¸¹ v(t) ´
R t
¹ v K(v;t): For any given distribution of capi-
tal, ^ ¸n(t) takes values in the interval [¸¡
³n
¹ v[±n(t¡¹ v)+1]; ^ ¸]; while ^ ¸o(t) 2 [¸¡
³o
v0[±o(t¡¹ v)+1];¸]:
At the arrival of the new GPT ^ ¸n(t) and ^ ¸o(t) are lower than ¸ for an interval of time
(i.e. ^ ¸n(t) < ¸; for t 2 [¹ v; ¹ t ]; and in this formulation, ^ ¸o(t) < ¸ for t 2 (¹ v;1)): Since
(^ ¸¡(^ ¸¡¸)¹ v
v ¡
³i
v[±i(t¡¹ v)+1]) is increasing in v and t, for i = o;n; as time passes and more
capital is accumulated in the more advanced vintages, ^ ¸i(t) will increase. The functions
¸ ¸i is de¯ned as follows: ¸ ¸n(v;t) ´ ^ ¸¡ (^ ¸¡ ¸) ¹ v
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It is convenient to introduce the following de¯nitions sh<¹ v ´
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K¸¹ v dv . Using the same approximation as
above, the e®ective capital stock can be expressed as:
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where for any ¯xed distribution of capital and for i = n;o; ¶ ¸i(t) are increasing functions
and ¶ ¸i(t) < ¸ for an interval after the arrival of the new GPT. ¹ ¸(t) and ~ ¸(t) are de¯ned











; which implies that both ¹ ¸(t) and ~ ¸(t) are smaller than ¸ for an interval
after the arrival of the new GPT.
47Plugging back ^ K(t) into Y(t) we obtain the desired expression.¥
Claim 2: The AA and the FF curves are upward sloping in the
¡
4¹ T; ¹ f
¢
space.






















e¡¸4 ¹ T ¡ e¡½4 ¹ T¤
+ a( ¹ f)¾2e¾24¹ T £










where the denominator is positive because ¸ < ½; and the numerator is also positive













a00( ¹ f)e(¾2¡½+¸)4 ¹ T¡1
¾2¡½+¸ + c00




a0( ¹ f)e(¾2¡½+¸)4¹ T +c0
m(¹ f)e¡(½¡¸)4¹ T¤
The numerator in this expression is unambiguously positive because both a00and c00 are
positive. The denominator is also positive if
¡a0(¹ f)e¾24 ¹ T
c0
m(¹ f) > 1: Using equation (F), this
can be rewritten as
1 >

















0 e¡(½¡¸)(4¹ T¡t)dt =
R4 ¹ T
0 e¡(½¡¸)tdt and e¡¾2t < 1 8t > 0; the condition
necessary for the denominator to be positive holds and FF is upward sloping too.¥
Proposition 1: There exist two positive numbers, ¹ c0
m¾ and ¡¹ a0
¾; such that if c0
m(:) is
bounded below by ¹ c0
m¾ and ¡a0(:) is bounded above by ¡¹ a0
¾ an increase in uncertainty
will increase the °exibility and the speed of di®usion. This restriction will be denoted as
condition 1.
Proof. : Let's de¯ne the functions A and F as follows:




















2e(¾2¡½+¸)4¹ T ¡ 1
¾2 ¡ ½+ ¸
+Ac(½¡ ¸)
F(4 ¹ T; ¹ f;¾2;¸) = ¡a0( ¹ f)
e(¾2¡½+¸)4¹ T ¡ 1
¾2 ¡ ½ +¸
¡ c0
m( ¹ f)
1 ¡ e¡(½¡¸)4¹ T
½ ¡ ¸
A(.) represents the net marginal bene¯t from delay and F(.) represents the net marginal
value of °exibility. Equations (A) and (F) can be written as:
A(4¹ T; ¹ f;¾
2;¸) = 0
F(4¹ T; ¹ f;¾
2;¸) = 0
For any given tuple (4¹ T;¾2;¸),
@F
@ ¹ f < 0; therefore equation F, implicitly de¯nes a
function of ¹ f interms of 4¹ T;¾2;¸: Let's denote this function as ¹ fF(4 ¹ T;¾2;¸): Plugging
it back into A, we obtain:
A(4¹ T; ¹ fF(4 ¹ T;¾2;¸);¾2;¸) = 0







































¹ f;¾2 ¡ MRSF
¹ f;¾2
MRSF




y;z denotes the marginal relation of substitution between y and z along
equation X: Note that from Claim 2, both MRSF
¹ f;4¹ T and MRSA
¹ f;4¹ T are positive. In
Claim 1.1 I show that @A
@¾2 < 0; and @A
@ ¹ f > 0; and therefore MRSA
¹ f;¾2 > 0: Claim 1 also
shows that MRSF
¹ f;¾2 > 0: As advanced above, this implies that the e®ect of ¾2 on 4¹ T
is ambiguous.
Claim 1.1: a) @A
@¾2 < 0:
b) @A
@ ¹ f > 0:
c) MRSF
¹ f;¾2 > 0:

















































































; where the denominator is negative because
the marginal value of °exibility is diminishing in the level of °exibility (i.e. ¡a0 > 0 and
c0











,by Leibnitz's rule. Note further that since a0 < 0; so is this derivative. It follows
immediately that MRSF
¹ f;¾2 > 0:2
This concludes the proof of claim 1. ¥
From expression (A1) it follows that if MRSA
¹ f;¾2 > MRSF
¹ f;¾2 and MRSF
¹ f;4¹ T < MRSA
¹ f;4¹ T;
d4¹ T
d¾2 < 0: Next I show that this is the case if condition 1 holds.
Claim 1.2: There exists a positive number ¡¹ a0
¾1 such that if ¡¹ a0
¾1 > ¡a0(:) 8f;
MRSA
¹ f;¾2 > MRSF
¹ f;¾2:













































































































A su±cient condition for this inequality to hold is that
a
0(¹ f)








R ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½¡¸)tdt+c00
m(¹ f)













Now to show that if ¡a0(¹ f) is bounded above by ¡¹ a0
¾1 inequality A2 holds I proceed in
two steps. First I show that the RHS of A2 is strictly positive and then I show that this
together with the upper bound imply the result.
Step 1: The RHS on A2 is strictly positive:
Note that 8 ¢¹ T > 0; both the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive.
Also, 8 ¹ f; a(¹ f) > 0; c00
m(¹ f) > 0; and a00( ¹ f) ¸ 0; therefore the RHS of A2 is strictly
positive.














R ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½¡¸)tdt+c00
m(¹ f)









hR ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½¡¸)tdt
i
, where a1 is a strictly positive integration constant. It follows that, since the LHS of
A2 is strictly increasing in ¡a0( ¹ f) and can be made arbitrarily close to zero by reducing
it, and the RHS is strictly positive, that there exists an upper bound ¡¹ a0
¾1 such that if
¡a0(f) < ¡¹ a0
¾1; 8f; inequality A2 holds and MRSA
¹ f;¾2 > MRSF
¹ f;¾2:2
52Claim 1.3: There exists a positive number ¡¹ a0
¾2 such that if ¡¹ a0
¾2 > ¡a0(:) 8f;
MRSA
¹ f;4¹ T > MRSF
¹ f;4¹ T:
Proof. : By de¯nition, MRSA












¹ f;4¹ T >
MRSF















































































And this is equivalent to
¡a





R ¢ ¹ T




R ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½+¸)tdt+c00
m(¹ f)








R ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½+¸)tdt+c0
m(¹ f)
R ¢ ¹ T
0 e¡(½¡¸)tdt
i
¾2 R ¢ ¹ T
0 e¾2t(1¡e¡(½¡¸)t)dt
As before, a su±cient condition from this inequality to hold is that the LHS is smaller
than the minimum of the RHS, i.e.
¡a





R ¢ ¹ T




R ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½+¸)tdt+c00
m(¹ f)







R ¢ ¹ T
0 e(¾2¡½+¸)tdt+c0
m(¹ f)
R ¢ ¹ T
0 e¡(½¡¸)tdt
i
¾2 R ¢ ¹ T
0 e¾2t(1¡e¡(½¡¸)t)dt
(A3)
8 ¢¹ T > 0 and ¹ f; the RHS of A3 is strictly positive. Note also that the LHS can be
arbitrarily close to zero by bounding ¡a0(¹ f) above. Therefore, there exists a positive
number ¡¹ a0
¾2 such that if ¡a0(:) is bounded above by ¡¹ a0
¾2; inequality A3 holds and
MRSA
¹ f;4¹ T > MRSF
¹ f;4¹ T:¤
53By selecting ¡¹ a0
¾ = minf¡¹ a0
¾1;¡¹ a0
¾2g, claims 1.2. and 1.3 prove the ¯rst part of the
proposition, i.e.
d4¹ T
d¾2 < 0. It remains to show that condition 1 is su±cient for
d ¹ f
d¾2 > 0:
For any giventuple ( ¹ f;¾2;¸), @A
@4¹ T < 0; therefore equation A de¯nes an implicit function
that maps ( ¹ f;¾2;¸) into 4¹ T: Let's denote it by 4¹ TA( ¹ f;¾2;¸): Plugging it back into F,
we obtain:
F(4 ¹ TA(¹ f;¾2;¸); ¹ f;¾2;¸) = 0







































4¹ T;¾2 ¡ MRSA
4¹ T;¾2
¡MRSF
4¹ T;¹ f +MRSA
4¹ T;¹ f
By claim 2, both MRSF
4¹ T;¹ f and MRSA
4¹ T; ¹ f are positive. Moreover, both MRSF
4¹ T;¾2
and MRSA
4¹ T;¾2 are negative. Therefore, the sign of
d¹ f
d¾2 is ambiguous. However, if
MRSF
4 ¹ T;¾2 < MRSA
4¹ T;¾2 and MRSF
4¹ T; ¹ f > MRSA
4 ¹ T; ¹ f;
d¹ f
d¾2 > 0: This is the case if condi-
tion 1 holds.
Claim 1.4: There exist a positive number ¹ c0
m¾ such that if c0
m(:) > ¹ c0
m¾ 8f; MRSF
4 ¹ T;¾2 <
MRSA
4 ¹ T;¾2:












































0 (e¡¸t ¡ e¡½t)dt +¾2R¢¹ T




























0 (e¡¸t ¡ e¡½t)dt+ ¾2R¢¹ T
0 e¾2t(1¡ e¡(½¡¸)t)dt
i


























































R ¢ ¹ T







¾2R ¢ ¹ T
0 e¾2t(1¡e¡(½¡¸)t)dt
i
Note that the RHS of A4 is strictly positivefor all ¢¹ T > 0; andall ¹ f: The LHS ofA4 can
be arbitrarily close to zero by making the c0
m( ¹ f) arbitrarily close to a0(¹ f)e¾2¢¹ T; therefore
for any given a0(¹ f); there exists a lower bound ¹ c0
m¾ for c0
m(:) such that if c0
m(:) > ¹ c0
m¾ 8f;
inequality A4 holds and MRSF
4¹ T;¾2 < MRSA
4¹ T;¾2:2
Claim 1.5: There exists a positive number ¡¹ a0
¾4 such that if ¡¹ a0
¾4 > ¡a0(:) 8f;
MRSF
4 ¹ T;¹ f > MRSA
4 ¹ T;¹ f:
Proof. : Set ¡¹ a0
¾4 = ¡¹ a0








Claims 1.4. and 1.5 prove the second part of the proposition, i.e.
d¹ f
d¾2 > 0: This concludes
the proof of the proposition. ¥
Claim 3: The net marginal value of °exibility increases with ¸;(i:e: @F
@¸ > 0):
























Using equation (F) it is very easy to see that the sign of @F






























where both ±1 and ±2 are positive weights that add up to one over the interval [0;¢¹ T];
and ±1 is increasing with t while ±2 is decreasing. It is straighforward that since the ±1
weights put more weight for higher t0s the ¯rst term must be larger than the second.
Hence @F
@¸ > 0:¥
Proposition 2: Thereexist twonumbers ¹ c0
m¸ and ¹ a
0
¸ suchthat if c0
m(:) is boundedbelow
by ¹ c0
m¸ and ¡a0(:) is bounded above by ¡¹ a
0
¸ an increase in the rate of technological
progress raises the °exibility and the speed of di®usion. This restriction will be referred
to as Condition 2.
Proof. : The proof of this proposition is identical to the proof of proposition 1 and
therefore I have not included it here. However, I will be glad to provide it if requested.
¥
Proposition 3: There exists a lower bound ¹ shf such that if shf(^ ¾2) > ¹ shf; ¸f will be
higher than ¸nf.
Proof. : Fix any pair of di®usion lags 4¹ Tf and 4¹ Tnf: For any level of nf; equation
Lnf de¯nes nnf as a continuously decreasing function of shf, at any interior equilibrium.
56For any level of nnf; equation Lf de¯nes nf as a monotonic increasing function of shf:
Therefore by increasing shf; nf will increase and nnf will fall. If shf = 1; the value of
an in°exible innovation is zero because there is no market for it, and therefore nnf = 0:
Therefore it exists a lower bound ¹ shf such that if shf(^ ¾2) > ¹ shf; nf > nnf. Since ¸ is
monotonically increasing in n, the ¯rst part of the proposition follows immediately. ¥
A.2 Calibration
This section describes the parameter values and functional forms used to simulate the
model and study the transitional dynamics after an increase in uncertainty. Before
describing the calibration a word of caution is appropriate. The purpose of this com-
putational exercise was to illustrate the qualitative evolution of several variables. The
parameters and functional forms are almost arbitrary and in no sense pretend to match
any actual economy.
Gross pro¯ts: ¼ = 6; ® = 0:3; ¸ = 0:01; ½ = 0:05:
The costs of operating the machine take the following form:
C(t;d;f) = [a0 +a1f
¡±e
°d + c0 + c1f
¯]e
¸t
where a0 = 0; c0 = 0; a1 = 0:3; c1 = 0:25; ± = 0:5; ¯ = 1:2; ° = 3:
Fixed cost of adoption: Ac = 2:5:
Uncertainty: in the low state ¾2 = 0:005776; in the high state, ^ ¾2 = 0:024336; the
marginal cost of producing capital, c = 0:1:
The implied adoption lags for the low and high uncertainty steady states are 4¹ Tl = 6:9
and 4 ¹ Th = 6:4. The levels of °exibility are fl = 0:68 and fh = 0:7563:
For the economy that cannot change the level of °exibility, this has been set up equal to
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Figure 12: Log-TFP of flexible vs. inflexible sectorsFigure 13: Directed Technological Progress
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Output Energy MaterialsTable 1: Decomposition of TFP growth into Embodied and Disembodied



































Standard errors in parentheses.
All equations estimated with sector fixed effects.Table 2: Volatility of Individual Stock Returns
Decade Mean >2years Median Trend Annual Stocks 50’s Stocks 60’s Value Weighted
50’s 0.076 0.075 0.073 0.075 0.33 0.076 - 0.059
60’s 0.109 0.107 0.097 0.106 0.43 0.085 0.11 0.066
70’s 0.147 0.142 0.137 0.142 0.51 0.129 0.14 0.085
80’s 0.156 0.156 0.136 0.152 0.5 0.174 0.16 0.089
90’s 0.16 0.154 0.136 0.155 0.56 0.19 0.17 0.081
Source: CRSP data set.
The 50’s goes from January 1947 to December 1959. The rest go from January of 19x0 to December of
19x9. Mean is the average standard deviation of monthly stock returns (including all distributions) during
the decade. >2years is the average standard deviation of monthly stock returns for those stocks with at least
24 months of observations in the decade. Median is the median standard deviation of individual monthly
stock returns. Trend is the average volatility of the deviations of the monthly stock returns from a linear fit
for each stock and decade. Yearly is the average standard deviation of yearly stock returns among those
stocks with more than two years of monthly stock returns in the decade. Stocks 50’s and 60’s control for
compositional effects by computing Mean for only the stocks that are in the data set in the 50’s and 60’s
respectively. Value Weighted is the value weighted average standard deviation of monthly stock returns
for the decade. The value weights are the share of the individual stock’ volume on total volume during the














































Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
Excess job reallocation rate=job creation rate+ job destruction rate- net employment
growth from Davis , Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). Year is a time trend. Sic-Dummies
are the 2-digit sic dummies.Table 4: Explaining the Increment in Uncertainty
Dependent
Variable


















2 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.0025
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by share in
value added. Sample size is 448 4-digit manufacturing industries.
 DSd7060 is the increment in average standard deviation of stock returns in the 4-digit
manufacturing sector between the 60’s and the 70’s. Dim7060 is the increment in the
average sectorial import share between the 60’s and the 70’s. Dex7060 is the increment in
the ratio of exports to shipments between the 60’s and the 70’s. Dop7060= Dim7060 +
Dex7060. Dcsh7060 is the difference between the share of OCAM in investment in 1977
and the same variable in 1967.Table 5: Volatility in Prices
Poly-1 Poly- 3 DP DP
Py Pe Pm Py Pe Pm Py Pe Pm Py Pe Pm
50’s
.0267 .0128 .0176 .0242 .0123 .0161 .0214 .0083 .0135
60’s
.0125 .0068 .0079 .0093 .0043 .0063 .0104 .0067 .0065
Pre-70’s .0183 .0075 .0118
70’s
.0415 .0375 .0256 .0367 .0371 .0225 .0328 .0426 .0187
80’s
.03 .0683 .0167 .0249 .0617 .0145 .0252 .0530 .0109
Post-70’s .031 .0489 .0153
All the variables are weighted averages over the 21 2-digit manufacturing sectors of the
standard deviations of some price level deflated by the aggregate producer price index of
the US economy along a given decade. Py is the price of sectorial final output, Pe is the
sectorial price of energy, Pm is the sectorial price of materials. The cells under the
heading Poly-1 contain the average standard deviation of the deviations of the price
variable from a decade and sector specific time trend. The cells under the heading Poly-3
contain the average standard deviation of the deviations of the price variable from a
decade and sector specific third order polynomial in time. The cells under the heading DP
contain the average standard deviation of the first difference of the price variable. The
50’s go from 1950 to 1959, the 60’s go from 1960 to 1969, the 70’s go from 1970 to
1979, and the 80’s go from 1980 to 1991.
Data source: Jorgenson, http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.htmlTable 6: Effect of computers on the TFP Slowdown
Dependent
Variable











































2 0.36 0.284 0.31 - 0.36 0.14 0.016 0.003




IV sd60’s IV sd60’s OLS OLS
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. Sample size is 448 4-digit
manufacturing industries.
TFPg 60’s is the average growth rate of TFP between 1958 and 1973. TFPg 70’s is the average growth rate of TFP between 1973 and
1980. D TFP g = TFPg 70’s - TFPg 60’s.  Comp. sh. xx  (BEA) is the share of office computing and accounting machines in total
investment in year 19xx.  Comp. sh. 77  (BBG) is the share of computers in total investment in 1977 as computed by Berman, Bound
and Griliches (1994).  D Comp. sh. (BEA)= Comp. sh. 77  (BEA) - Comp. sh. 67  (BEA). D Comp. sh. 87 (BEA) = [Comp. sh. 92
(BEA)+ Comp. sh. 82  (BEA) ]/2- Comp. sh. 77  (BEA).Table 7: Did uncertainty cause the slowdown?
Dependent
Variable








































2 0.027 0.20 0.27 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.016
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
All regressions run at the 4-digit manufacturing sector. The sample size for all regressions but columns 4
and 5 is 448, while columns 4 and 5 pool the data for three decades and therefore have 448*3=1344. In all
regressions, observations are weighted by the average share of value added.
xy represents the increment in the variable x between decade y and the  previous one. in period y.  [\\YY
denotes the increment in variable x between 19yy and 19vv. x can be the average growth rate of TFP
growth (TFPg), the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (sdr), the standard deviation of the annual
growth rate of shipments (sdgship) and the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of TFP (sdtfpg).
Csh denotes the share of expenditures in OCAM (office computing and accounting machines) over total
































2 .297 .19 .285 .29
N 896 896 448x3=1344 448x3=1344
 Effects Random Random Fixed Fixed
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
Comp. sh.  (BEA) is the share of office computing and accounting machines (OCAM) in
total investment in the years 1967 1977. The computer share for 1987 for the BEA is
linearly extrapolated from the computer shares in 1982 and 1992 from the same source.
Comp. sh.  (BBG) is the share of computers in total investment in 1977  and 1987 as
computed by Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). Sdl is the average standard deviation
of monthly stock returns during the previous decade. Txx are time specific dummies.